The political implications of evidence-based approaches (aka start of this week’s wonkwar on the results agenda)

The political implications of evidence-based approaches
The debate on evidence and results continues to rage. Rosalind Eyben and Chris Roche, two of the organiser’s of next April’s Big Push Forward conference on the Politics of  Evidence, kick off a discussion. Tomorrow Chris Whitty, DFID’s Director of Research and Evidence and Chief Scientific Adviser, and Stefan Dercon, its Chief Economist, respond
Distinct from its more general usage of what is observed or experienced, ‘evidence’ has acquired a particular meaning relating to proof about ‘what works’, particularly through robust evidence from rigorous experimental trials. But no-one really believes that it is feasible for external development assistance to consist purely of ‘technical’ interventions. Most development workers do not see themselves as scientists in a laboratory, but more as reflective practitioners seeking to learn how to support locally generated transformative processes for greater equity and social justice. Where have these experimental approaches come from and what is at stake?
The origins and critiques of evidence-based approaches
Evidence-based approaches are pre-occupied with avoiding bias and increasing the precision of estimates of effect. In the UK they spread beyond clinical practice when the government elected in 1997 was keen to demonstrate that its decisions would not be driven by political ideology but rather by objective evidence. Evidence-based approaches became linked to value for money concerns to deliver ‘results’ as efficiently and effectively as possible, by a government recently described as ‘truth junkies’.
Yet, even within medicine, the leap from evidence-based clinical practice into evidence-based policy was challenged. A British Medical Journal article by Nick Black in 2001 drew on an extensive body of contemporary literature on policy processes to argue that policy was shaped by institutional arrangements, values and beliefs and a variety of different sources of information.  Opponents of evidence-based education critiqued its positivist assumptions; its linear cause-effect thinking; and the poor understanding of the tensions between scientific and democratic control of educational practice. An OECD report in 2007 on the reasons for the uptake of evidence-based education  in Sweden, the UK, Canada, the USA and Australia, noted the increasing pressure for greater accountability of expenditure and effectiveness, an explosion in the search for measurable outcomes, and demands that impacts and effectiveness be given a monetary value.  The same report noted that evidence-based approaches were largely absent in OECD countries ‘less used to empirical and quantitative methodologies in the social sciences.’ The de-politicization of policy making is one of the reasons given by  development researchers for its neglect in France.
In UK social policy, evidence based approaches with their ‘gold standard’ of experimental or quasi-experimental design, have been criticised as being inapplicable to complex issues.In What Works, Tony Harrison argued that evidence-based approaches can only apply in cases of individual treatment and not at the wider community level where multiple perspectives come into play and no agreement exists about the nature of the problem.This of course is the case with most development programmes, and in particular those that seek transformational change.
Evidence based approaches in development: an anti-politics firewall?
Arguably evidence-based approaches build an anti-politics firewall. Development assistance becomes a ‘technical’ best practice intervention based on rigorous objective evidence, delivering best value for money to domestic taxpayers and recipient country citizens mostly without interfering in that country’s politics. They are the latest manifestation of  a certain long-standing approach to development that as Timothy Mitchell wrote in the Power of Development (J. Crush et al 1997), speaks to the sector’s ‘need to overlook its internal involvement in the places and problems it analyses and present itself instead as an external intelligence that stands outside the objects it describes’.
In the 1930’s Africa was seen as ‘a living laboratory’ to achieve improvements in the welfare of the populations . Evidence-based approaches are reviving the development as laboratory idea. In 2012 the World Bank established a Gender Innovation Lab to design ‘innovative interventions to address gender inequality and to develop rigorous research projects in order to produce evidence on what works and what does not’.  Jeffrey Sachs’ Millennium Villages have been framed as  ‘laboratories to lift people out of poverty’. The most well-known is the J-Pal Poverty Action Lab whose mission is to reduce poverty ‘by ensuring that policy is based on scientific evidence’.
In the absence of political debate, this approach can exacerbate the tendency to see people as subjects requiring treatment, rather than as citizens with political voice. Power silences any challenges to the technical framing of ‘the problem’, foreclosing discussion of the structural causes and consequences of inequity and how these should be tackled.To act ‘technically’ in a politically complex context can make external actors pawns of more powerful vested interests and therefore by default makes them, albeit unintentionally, political actors.
High stakes
Evidence-based technical approaches can therefore deflect attention from the centrality of power, politics and ideology in shaping society. We agree with the view of the Developmental Leadership Program that recent research suggests that  the development sector should be ‘at the frontier of a narrative shift between a technical, rational, and scientific approach to development, and a recognition that politics matters; that poverty reduction is not a technical problem but requires significant social change, and that this social change is, and must be, both political and locally led.’ However this has some significant implications for external actors. We need to be self-aware to avoid disempowering others.  This requires undertaking power analyses with ourselves factored in – as organisations and individuals who can make a positive or negative contribution, often inadvertently.  It means engaging with a wider and more diverse group of policy actors in the state, civil society and the private sector; whenever possible, supporting debate, locally-driven problem solving, and independent research. It means avoiding overly linear project based aid modalities that demand omniscience before they have even begun.
As Michael Sandel has recently argued in his book about the moral limits to markets  how we put values (and prices) on things can change their meaning, as well as change the relationship between economic actors.  More information, dare we say ‘evidence’, is needed to draw some firmer conclusions about the consequences of evidence-based approaches to designing projects and assessing results. This is why the Big Push Forward is currently seeking to crowd-source more information from development practitioners about how they actually experience the ‘results’ agenda, and why we believe this issue needs more debate.

Ros Eyben portraitThe debate on evidence and results continues to rage. Rosalind Eyben (left) and Chris Roche (right, dressed for battle), two of the organisers of Chris Roche in XianApril’s Big Push Forward conference on the Politics of  Evidence, kick off a discussion. Tomorrow Chris Whitty, DFID’s Director of Research and Evidence and Chief Scientific Adviser, and Stefan Dercon, its Chief Economist, respond

Distinct from its more general usage of what is observed or experienced, ‘evidence’ has acquired a particular meaning relating to proof about ‘what works’, particularly through robust evidence from rigorous experimental trials. But no-one really believes that it is feasible for external development assistance to consist purely of ‘technical’ interventions. Most development workers do not see themselves as scientists in a laboratory, but more as reflective practitioners seeking to learn how to support locally generated transformative processes for greater equity and social justice. Where have these experimental approaches come from and what is at stake?

The origins and critiques of evidence-based approaches

Evidence-based approaches are pre-occupied with avoiding bias and increasing the precision of estimates of effect. In the UK they spread beyond clinical practice when the government elected in 1997 was keen to demonstrate that its decisions would not be driven by political ideology but rather by objective evidence. Evidence-based approaches became linked to value for money concerns to deliver ‘results’ as efficiently and effectively as possible, by a government recently described as ‘truth junkies’.

Yet, even within medicine, the leap from evidence-based clinical practice into evidence-based policy was challenged. A British Medical Journal article by Nick Black in 2001 drew on an extensive body of contemporary literature on policy processes to argue that policy was shaped by institutional arrangements, values and beliefs and a variety of different sources of information.

Opponents of evidence-based education critiqued its positivist assumptions; its linear cause-effect thinking; and the poor understanding of the tensions between scientific and democratic control of educational practice. An OECD report in 2007 on the reasons for the uptake of evidence-based education in Sweden, the UK, Canada, the USA and Australia, noted the increasing pressure for greater accountability of expenditure and effectiveness, an explosion in the search for measurable outcomes, and demands that impacts and effectiveness be given a monetary value.

The same report noted that evidence-based approaches were largely absent in OECD countries ‘less used to empirical and quantitative methodologies in the social sciences.’ The de-politicization of policy making is one of the reasons given by development researchers for its neglect in France.

In UK social policy, evidence-based approaches with their ‘gold standard’ of experimental or quasi-experimental design, have been criticised as being inapplicable to complex issues. In What Works, Tony Harrison argued that evidence-based approaches can only apply in cases of individual treatment and not at the wider community level where multiple perspectives come into play and no agreement exists about the nature of the problem.This of course is the case with most development programmes, and in particular those that seek transformational change.

Evidence based approaches in development: an anti-politics firewall?

Gandhi v logframe cartoonArguably evidence-based approaches build an anti-politics firewall. Development assistance becomes a ‘technical’ best practice intervention based on rigorous objective evidence, delivering best value for money to domestic taxpayers and recipient country citizens mostly without interfering in that country’s politics. They are the latest manifestation of  a certain long-standing approach to development that as Timothy Mitchell wrote in Power of Development, speaks to the sector’s ‘need to overlook its internal involvement in the places and problems it analyses and present itself instead as an external intelligence that stands outside the objects it describes’.

In the 1930s Africa was seen as ‘a living laboratory’ to achieve improvements in the welfare of the populations. Evidence-based approaches are reviving the development-as-laboratory idea. In 2012 the World Bank established a Gender Innovation Lab to design ‘innovative interventions to address gender inequality and to develop rigorous research projects in order to produce evidence on what works and what does not’.  Jeffrey Sachs’ Millennium Villages have been framed as  ‘laboratories to lift people out of poverty’. The most well-known is the J-Pal Poverty Action Lab whose mission is to reduce poverty ‘by ensuring that policy is based on scientific evidence’.

In the absence of political debate, this approach can exacerbate the tendency to see people as subjects requiring treatment, rather than as citizens with political voice. Power silences any challenges to the technical framing of ‘the problem’, foreclosing discussion of the structural causes and consequences of inequity and how these should be tackled. To act ‘technically’ in a politically complex context can make external actors pawns of more powerful vested interests and therefore by default makes them, albeit unintentionally, political actors.

High stakes

Evidence-based technical approaches can therefore deflect attention from the centrality of power, politics and ideology in shaping society. We agree with the view of the Developmental Leadership Program that recent research suggests that  the development sector should be ‘at the frontier of a narrative shift between a technical, rational, and scientific approach to development, and a recognition that politics matters; that poverty reduction is not a technical problem but requires significant social change, and that this social change is, and must be, both political and locally led.’

However this has some significant implications for external actors. We need to be self-aware to avoid disempowering others.  This requires undertaking power analyses with ourselves factored in – as organisations and individuals who can make a positive or negative contribution, often inadvertently.  It means engaging with a wider and more diverse group of policy actors in the state, civil society and the private sector; whenever possible, supporting debate, locally-driven problem solving, and independent research. It means avoiding overly linear project-based aid modalities that demand omniscience before they have even begun.

As Michael Sandel has recently argued in his book about the moral limits to markets, how we put values (and prices) on things can change their meaning, as well as change the relationship between economic actors.  More information, (dare we say ‘evidence’), is needed to draw some firmer conclusions about the consequences of evidence-based approaches to designing projects and assessing results. This is why the Big Push Forward is currently seeking to crowd-source more information from development practitioners about how they actually experience the ‘results’ agenda, and why we believe this issue needs more debate.

And make sure you come back tomorrow for DFID’s counterblast

January 22nd, 2013 | 25 Comments

What do DFID wonks think of Oxfam’s attempt to measure its effectiveness?

More DFIDistas on the blog: this time Nick York, DFID’s top evaluator and Caroline Hoy, who covers NGO evaluation, comment on Oxfam’s publication of a set of 26 warts-and-all programme effectiveness reviews.

Having seen Karl Hughes’s 3ie working paper on process tracing and talked to the team in Oxfam about evaluation approaches, Caroline Hoy (our lead on evaluation for NGOs) and I have been reading with considerable interest the set of papers that Jennie Richmond has shared with us on ‘Tackling the evaluation challenge – how do we know we are effective?’.

From DFID’s perspective, and now 2 years into the challenges of ‘embedding evaluation’ in a serious way into our own work, we know how difficult it often is to find reliable methods to identify what works and measure impact for complex development interventions.  Although it is relatively well understood how to apply standard techniques in some areas – such as health, social protection, water and sanitation and microfinance – there are whole swathes of development where we need to be quite innovative and creative in finding approaches to evaluation that can deal with the complexity of the issues and the nature of the programmes.  Many of these areas are where NGOs such as Oxfam do their best work.

So we would really like to welcome and applaud Oxfam’s new Effectiveness Reviews, which adopt a clear and practical framework for assessing what difference it is making, through its partners, in the development process. It is a big step forward for them – and it would be great if it also inspires other organisations to develop new and interesting approaches to measuring results and undertake rigorous analysis of what works.  Clearly this needs to be done in a way which each organisation can afford and resource – things need to be done in a proportionate way – but the Oxfam initiative shows some of what is possible.

They have chosen quite a practical strategy – picking out a random sample and then probing more deeply and using different techniquescartoon-evaluation_culture to measure impact or use well-tried monitoring of performance indicators.

Of course there is one potential drawback – random sampling may mean there are gaps in what you can say, if key areas don’t happen to have been sampled this time.  Oxfam also notes that the reviews do not necessarily enable full understanding of why a programme is successful (e.g. in Pakistan) and that they now need to go back and undertake some more work.   One way round this is more purposive sampling – we don’t know if this was considered –  or identifying priority themes up front based on what the organisational objectives are, and focusing on them in some depth.  The key challenge is finding a strategy for using the limited resources for evaluation and data collection in a targeted way that gives a nice balance between extensive coverage and intensive analysis.

Another challenge is maintaining the independence and integrity of those carrying out the evaluations.   Finding impartial observers – given that many people and experts have worked for years in these areas and know each other well – can be difficult.

The very interesting study of policy influencing by Oxfam’s partner in Bolivia, Fundacion Jubileo, is worth looking at in some detail.   It made a good case that the grantee was really having an impact on some key aspects of social change in Bolivia The evaluators clearly applied the process tracing technique skilfully and identified the most significant changes – but it must have been difficult to stay objective when doing the interviews, working with the grantee and identifying who was really influencing whom.  Howard White and Daniel Phillips’s paper on ‘small n’ techniques talks a lot about the biases that one needs to avoid in using these techniques.  The appendix to the study provides an excellent and useful set of reflections on the use of the process tracing methodology and what the evaluators learned.

One key assumption is that by doing more work and collecting more data (e.g. from comparison sites in Zambia and the Philippines), they will be able to understand and demonstrate impact.   Actually, based on discussions we have had with Michael Woolcock recently in DFID, we have started to ask a different sort of question.    In some types of programmes, more data and more work may not be the solution Gandhi v logframe cartoon- more innovative methods and approaches to understanding impact can be required and if the programme itself develops as you implement it then the goal posts are continually shifting too.

Looking ahead, and thinking about the next stages of this agenda….first, we would encourage others to share their approaches and experiences in the way that Oxfam has done.   Second, it would be great to see Oxfam and other NGOs sharing resources to develop better methods across the sector, given their common challenge of demonstrating results and the limited resources.   The results agenda is particularly challenging for smaller organisations, whose inputs are increasingly recognised – so can we ask if Oxfam sees itself as in a position to demonstrate leadership in linking with such organisation to jointly share and explore results?

Nick York is DFID’s Chief Professional Officer – Evaluation and Caroline Hoy, its Results and Evaluation Specialist, Civil Society Department.

October 24th, 2012 | 2 Comments

Powered by WordPress | Design modified by Eddy Lambert from the Blue Weed theme by Blog Oh! Blog | Entries (RSS) and Comments (RSS).