Are dogs the real population problem on climate change?

After Copenhagen, allow me some bleak Christmas humour. If you’re a dog lover, look away now. But before you reach for the green ink, remember this is an attempt at satire.

I got some fairly aggressive responses to my recent posts on population, and one of the core arguments of the population controllers seemed to be that because climate change and women’s rights over their fertility (see previous blog for why I reject the term ‘population control’) are both important, there is no harm in linking them. On that argument, since education, land tenure, arms control, housing, domestic violence etc etc etc are all important aspects of development, they too should be on the table in Copenhagen. Clearly nonsense.

But while we’re on the subject of carbon emitting populations, let’s talk about dogs. Britain is, famously, a nation of dog lovers. Actually it’s bitterly divided between cat people and dog people. We Brits own eight million cats, eight million dogs and very few of us own one of each (not least because they don’t get on).

For the record, I am a cat person. I once ate a dog (or part of one) in a backstreet Korean

restaurant and it was delicious. Not a qualm. Anyway, back to dogs and climate change. The BBC’s ‘Ethical Man’ (probably another cat lover) has done the numbers. Keeping a medium-sized dog has the same ecological impact as driving a 4.6 litre Land Cruiser (I assume that’s some kind of car) 10,000km a year.

Using a unit known as a ‘global hectare’ – a measure of the land area needed to support a certain ecological footprint, growing and manufacturing the 164kg of meat and 95kg of cereals a border collie or cocker spaniel eats every year takes about 0.84 gha. A bigger dog such as a German shepherd consumes even more – its carbon pawprint is more like 1.1 gha. That is more than the environmental footprint of the average Indian person, who uses just 0.8 gha of resources. If you are a multiple dog owner you are in even more trouble. Two big dogs are responsible for more carbon emissions than some British citizens.

By contrast a cat (hah!) needs 0.15 gha, a hamster 0.014 gha, and a canary 0.007 gha. The most carbon efficient pet is a goldfish. Its carbon finprint requires just 0.00034 gha. That’s over 3,000 fish per pooch.

So if you care about climate change, join my new campaign. Our key demand is a ‘fish for fidos’ scheme, loosely based on Cash for Clunkers, whereby people trade in their dogs in return for goldfish. It makes at least as much sense to promote this as a solution to climate change as human population control in poor countries. Any takers, pop controllers?

And with that, you’ll be relieved to hear, I’m signing off and taking a break. Whether you celebrate Christmas, just lie around and eat and drink too much, or carry on as usual, enjoy the next two weeks and see (or at least talk at) you in 2010.

Copenhagen: where do we go from here?

Wow, where to begin. I wasn’t in Copenhagen, but followed it from afar. A couple of reflections and then some highlights from two of the more comprehensive post mortems.

Firstly, geopolitics. 2009 began with The G7 still apparently in the driving seat, saw the formal recognition of the shift from G7 to G20 in Pittsburgh, and then ended with the US negotiating the ‘Copenhagen Accord’ with the BASIC group of countries (Brazil, India, China and South Africa), with Europe ‘airbrushed out of the picture’ in the words of a scathing FT leader and an equally critical Economist blog. Is this the new world order or a one-off? 2010 should reveal all.

Second politics (or rather lack of it). All the effort has gone into understanding the science and economics of climate change, but in the end, it is politics that will have to deliver. Politicians negotiate with each other, not with the climate. Yet there is no decent political equivalent of the Stern Report (whose actual title was ‘The Economics of Climate Change’). A ‘Politics of Climate Change’ would look at all the different steps and options to keep below two degrees and map out the drivers and  blockers for each, showing which are more/less achievable in a kind of political version of the McKinsey cost abatement curve.

In terms of the negotiations, the chaotic management of Copenhagen begs the question, ‘where have other international negotiations delivered anything comparable, and what can we learn from them?’ Is there nothing useful we can inject from past successes at Bretton Woods, the Montreal Protocol, the land mines treaty, the cluster munitions convention or the creation of the UN system? 

To the post mortems. Firstly, ‘Climate Shame: get back to the table’ (13 pages), by my colleague Kate Raworth. The paper usefully dissects the Copenhagen Accord para by para. Hereare some of the overall highlights:

‘The talks in Copenhagen, and the two years leading up to them, were undermined by a style of deal-making unfit for driving collective action in a multi-polar world. The failed tactics of world trade talks – high stakes brinkmanship – have, once again, led to a result that is in no-one’s interests.’

‘Rich-country pledges going into the negotiations added up to merely 11-19 per cent cuts by 2020. Worse, the current rules for counting and trading rich-country emissions are riddled with loopholes. Take account of these loopholes and rich-country pledged cuts could actually result in their total emissions being higher in 2020 than in 1990, heading the world towards a catastrophic temperature rise of 4 degrees C by 2100.’

‘Copenhagen wasn’t just about leaders doing their best – it was about them doing what was necessary. The Copenhagen Accord may end up as a postcard to the future – from a generation of leaders who stumbled separately in the dark, instead of uniting behind an ambitious and decisive vision.’

‘In the final, chaotic hours of negotiations the US, China, India, Brazil, and South Africa – without the EU – drew up a text which was then discussed by 25 heads of state, and turned into the Copenhagen Accord. It was tabled before all countries late in the night, giving them one hour to read and sign on. The EU reluctantly agreed, but many developing countries refused, and so the conference ‘noted’ rather than ‘adopted’ the Accord – turning it into a petition open for national signups. They also agreed to keep negotiating for another year based on the two official texts produced through the formal UN process. Ironically – and fortunately – these texts hold far more promise than the Accord for producing the deal needed.’

‘Both official tracks of talks were given extended mandates to keep meeting for another year. The good news is that the draft text on long-term cooperative action (LCA) still contains most of the options needed to secure a fair, and ambitious and binding deal – though some key additions will be needed in 2010. And the bad news? The most promising options could all be lost, instead of strengthened, with the sweep of a pen. That is why visionary leadership and full public attention must accompany the process through the year.’

‘Hitting Reboot: Where next for climate after Copenhagen’ (20 pages) by Alex Evans and David Steven concentrates on where we go from here:

‘The next deadline is the end of January 2010, when countries will list their proposed commitments. Two key tracks will then run through 2010. The first runs through the US Senate. Assuming that health care finally passes, will the Senate swiftly agree a climate bill? [New York Times view here] If so, how weakened will it have been in passage? Will its provisions leave Obama able to promise a 17% reduction by 2020 with any credibility? Second, there is the post-Copenhagen process – where prospects now look shaky.’

‘Dealmakers should react to Copenhagen by steering into the skid. Rather than signaling retreat, they should resist the urge to hit the brakes, and keep the wheels of the process pointed towards the desired endpoint 2°C.’

Alex and David make 12 recommendations for ‘rebooting’ the climate change talks, including:

Rebuild trust in the science, using independent reviews to repair the damage from the UEA emails and reestablish the authority of the IPCC 

Create a common language to aid deal making. The 2ºC target has been successful in helping set a widely accepted goal for climate policy. Now leaders need to push for a long term global budget for emissions, A date for peak global emissions and using national per capita emissions as a yardstick

Pursue quick wins alongside the post-Copenhagen process. Examples: REDD (reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation) and reducing soot emissions.

Build low carbon into fiscal tightening. The chance of funding a ‘green new deal’ via fiscal stimuli was largely squandered, but in the next few years, governments will have to cut spending as they wrestle with deficits swollen by the global economic crisis. This fiscal tightening offers a second chance for policymakers to promote low carbon technology (eg carbon taxes, or cutting subsidies to fossil fuels and polluting technologies).

Invest in Technology: developed countries should double public R&D expenditure on low carbon technologies by 2015 and quadruple it by 2020

Set up a climate equivalent of the Congressional Budget Office: an International Climate Performance Committee (ICPC), as an independent body, would assess the impact of different negotiating proposals and ensure everyone is negotiating on the basis of the same data.

Create incentives for developing countries to take on binding targets 

This is just the start of the post mortems. The challenge is that 2010 will need to see urgent efforts at sorting out the climate change negotiating system without introducing further delays in getting to a FAB (fair, ambitious and binding) agreement. Today’s Financial Times has some pointers on what the UN is already planning.

Expanders v restrainers; garlic bubbles; AJ Ayer v Mike Tyson; cash on delivery and martial ping pong: links I liked

Copenhagen round up to follow tomorrow, but in the meantime…….

A couple of Copencurtain raisers worth reading: ‘Humanity is no longer split between conservatives and liberals, reactionaries and progressives. Today the battle lines are drawn between expanders and restrainers.’ George Monbiot gets better and better (and I never thought I’d say that). HelpAge International’s Copenhagen briefing argues that older people are both a (neglected) reservoir of experience of climate change, and among the worst affected.

China’s garlic bubble. Ugh.

The rule of law, spotted by Chris Blattman

AJ Ayer and Mike Tyson fight (or at least spar) over Naomi Campbell. How I hope that this actually happened. [h/t Alex Evans]

Owen Barder responds to some good questions from my former NGO, CAFOD about the proposal for making aid Cash on Delivery

Finally, it’s the end of the world, but hey we’ve still got youtube. 100 highlights from 2009. Still working through them, but Bruce Lee (allegedly) playing ping (with nunchucks, and winning) has to be a) up there and b) fake

Live coverage and analysis of (maybe) final day in Copenhagen

A few newspapers are running the kind of minute by minute commentaries normally reserved for soccer matches. Gripping stuff, but will it make history?

The Guardian

The Times

Between microfinance and big bank lending there is…. a Missing Middle

Credit is the lifeblood of farming – you need cash to plant seeds, buy fertiliser and stay alive long long enough to reap and sell your harvest and pay off your loan. But you can’t always get it when you need it. A new Oxfam research paper identifies one of the main market failures resulting from the retreat of the state in agriculture: the dearth of finance for producer associations and other forms of SMEs (small- and medium-sized enterprises) in agriculture, for transactions in the size range £5,000 to £500,000. While microfinance has at last begun to add some poor rural households to its traditional urban customer base and formal financial institutions work for the big farmers and companies, this ‘missing middle’ is largely neglected.

The problems are on both the supply and demand sides. On the supply side big national lenders don’t delegate to rural branches and enable them to assess the risks and get credit flowing. One bright spot, weather insurance, is under jeopardy as climate change steadily increases risks. However, there is some good news: a range of philanthropic foundations and international financial institutions are offering partial credit guarantees to lenders, helping reduce their risks and boost the flow of credit.

On the demand side, only one third of smallholders are aggregated in some form of group enterprise, appropriate for larger transactions, while individual farmers are usually reluctant to take on such big debts. Women farmers suffer from educational discrimination, limited mobility, lack of land rights, and restrictive social norms. They are virtually excluded from agricultural credit and extension services, despite heading up one in five farms, and being capable achieving large productivity gains.

What to do? The report identifies some useful institutional development that can get credit markets working better, including:

Strengthening independent services recording legal ownership of items and their location

Improving the working markets for land in rural areas

Persuading financial institutions and their regulators to allow the collateralisation of debts owed to the enterprise, crops in various stages of processing, and personal property such as jewellery – important for women farmers.

Setting up credit information bureaux to improve the flow of information to potential lenders

Encourage ‘apex organizations’ of small lenders to pool risk and get access to emergency liquidity if things go pear-shaped

Reform national agricultural development banks (the report is even agnostic on the merits of privatisation – very daring for an NGO!)

It’s very different from the normal run of NGO research papers, written by finance professionals for their peers, but worth a skim even if you’re a financial illiterate like me.

Tobin tax update: how momentum is building for a Financial Transactions Tax

The momentum behind the Financial Transactions Tax (a tiny levy of 0.005% on all financial trades would raise about $30bn a year for climate change, development and/or filling fiscal holes) continues to grow since my last post (Why has the Tobin Tax gone mainstream?).

The French government, which as far back as 2003 was the first to seriously propose the tax, portrays it as one of the innovative financial instruments needed to finance development and climate change response. See for example the recent op-ed by the Finance and Foreign Ministers, Lagarde and Kouchner, in Le Monde saying they support an FTT to finance development.

In advance of its recent pre budget report, the UK government issued a report supporting exploring the FTT as one of a number of options. On 10 December, President Sarkozy and Gordon Brown wrote a joint op-ed in the Wall Street Journal calling for ‘examination’ of an FTT, among other measures, to contribute to climate change response and achieving the MDGs. The European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso has also weighed in in support.

In the US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi expressed qualified support on the FTT on the 7th December, while various heavyweight economists have come out in favour, including Paul Krugman in the New York Times. A democratic congressman, Peter Di Fazio has introduced a bill in Congress calling for a tax on financial transactions, to help pay for job creation in the US. This is supported by 25 other congressmen, and calls for a 0.25 percent tax on every applicable transaction, which its proponent believe would generate nearly $150 billion a year. In response Treasury Secretary Tim Geitner moderated his initial opposition to an FTT, saying merely that ‘he has not seen a version of this tax that would work for the US’.

The worry in all this is the role of the IMF, tasked by the G20 in Pittsburgh to look at ‘ways in which the financial sector could be made to contribute to the cost of the bailouts’ and report back to the G20 meeting in April 2010 (a draft report will also be presented to the G7 finance ministers in February). At the IMF meetings in Istanbul, Dominique Strauss Kahn, the Managing Director of the World Bank, appeared to say that the IMF would not be looking at transaction taxes, or ‘simplistic tobin taxes’, but pressure from the Europeans has made him adopt a more open-minded position. At least in public. But there has to be doubt over whether the Fund has made up its mind before conducting the analysis – watch out for some ‘policy-based evidence making’ over the next few months. A lot will depend on the calibre of the external inputs to the IMF from technical experts outside of the fund.

Movement at the political level is being pushed by a nascent global campaign by NGOs, campaigners and economists:
· Health groups around the world are already very organised and working together on campaigning for a currency transaction levy (CTL) for health
· In Germany a major campaign has been launched to press for the FTT that has already gained the 50,000 signatures required to ensure hearings on the tax in the Bundestag.
· French campaigners have already met with government and are working on next steps.
· In the UK a broad coalition is forming to support a campaign, running intensely from January to April 2010, to the G20 finance ministers meeting in Washington. Their joint campaign will launch in January just before Davos.
· Richard Curtis (Film director and creative energy behind the Make Poverty History Campaign) is very interested in a short FTT campaign. He was behind the idea of the white band in 2005.

The next few months could be crucial if the FTT is to become the Fast Track Tax. If the momentum builds, then the G20 discussion in April could be a turning point. My one query is that I still haven’t heard anything from developing country governments, economists or civil society organizations – any news?

Breakfast (and climate change megabucks) with George Soros

Last week George Soros was passing through London and invited a bunch of NGO types for breakfast at his very nice house in South Kensington. (In case you’re interested we all got sticky pastries, but George made do with grapefruit and muesli). He was en route to Copenhagen to launch his big new idea – using the IMF to pump prime global funding for climate change. How does it work? Here’s the excellent summary put out by his team:

‘Rich countries could double available funding to combat climate change by donating recently issued Special Drawing Rights to a new green fund. This fund would jumpstart investment in low carbon energy sources, reforestation efforts, rain forest protection, land use reform, and adaptation programs.

Unlike other proposed solutions, this plan could be implemented within already existing financial structures. SDRs, issued by the International Monetary Fund, amount to additional foreign exchange. In response to the global financial crisis in September 2009, the IMF issued $283 billion in SDRs, with more than $150 billion going to the 15 largest developed economies. This sits largely untouched in their reserve accounts, leaving a surplus that could be donated to the fund.

The IMF currently has 100 million ounces of gold, at current prices worth more than $100 billion at book value. The IMF has decided that the surplus value of its gold be used to benefit the least developed countries. Under this plan, the IMF would use its gold reserves to cover the interest incurred by the developed countries that donated their SDRs.

Paying the interest in this way would mean that developed countries would not be saddled with interest payments. In addition, the gold can also be used to guarantee the repayment of loans for the climate projects if the carbon market fails to develop as envisioned.

“This approach gives developed countries an additional incentive to create effective carbon markets,” said Soros. “If they fail, they will have to use the IMF gold reserves to cover the loan principal. This forces countries to put their money where their mouth is.”

A rapid independent analysis by the European Climate Foundation  (not up on the web yet, sorry) concluded:

‘Our analysis shows that $100 billion of SDRs allocated to a climate fund or funds could provide about $7 billion1 per year in grants, loan and equity financing to developing countries on an annual basis for the next 30-40 years. The SDR source would meet the tests of predictable funding flows, strong performance incentives, and limited short-term budgetary impact on developed country finances. This use of SDRs, particularly for adaptation, could potentially be justified under the mandate of the IMF given the adverse impacts of climate change will negatively impact the balance of payments and currency reserves of vulnerable countries.’

The interesting precedent here is using the huge amount of gold lying around in the IMF to turn SDRs into free, potentially indefinite loans for poor countries. He’s gone for the existing SDR issue because that could be rapidly turned into cash for climate change adaptation, but the IMF’s idle gold mountain could cover the interest payments on a new and much larger SDR issue, potentially generating trillions of dollars for climate change and development. Soros describes it as, if not a free, then a ‘cheap lunch’. It looks to me like a kind of global, climate-focussed form of quantitative easing.

If it’s so easy, why hasn’t it happened already? Soros sees the main obstacles as political, not technical. Mainly, they consist of opposition in the US Congress and to a lesser extent, Germany, based on fears of inflation and the impact on the dollar/euro’s positions as international reserve currencies (China’s Central Bank governor recently argued that SDRs could provide the basis of a viable global currency). Congress would need to approve a change in the IMF’s articles of agreement before they could issue new SDRs and that is highly unlikely, unless massive public pressure builds to make it happen (as it did previously with debt relief). That’s why he’s stuck to the already issued SDRs in this proposal.

Soros sees the SDR proposal as a complement to other ways to raise additional funds for climate change and development, such as the Financial Transactions Tax.  Put them in the pot along with bunker fuel taxes, airline taxes etc, and you have the makings of a grand bargain that could fund the kinds of vast technological and economic shifts required to avoid climate catastrophe and achieve lasting development. Soros contrasts this with what he calls ‘the usual $10 billion’ likely to be agreed at Copenhagen, as at other summits, much of it merely recycling existing spending commitments.

So has Mr Soros found $100bn down the back of the sofa? This kind of funny money discussion makes my head spin, but when it comes to financial alchemy, Soros knows what he’s talking about  He famously turned a $1bn profit by ‘breaking the pound’ in 1992. He’s given away $6bn in his philanthropic work, but is still the 29th richest person in the world, worth about $11bn (enough on its own to end world poverty for at least a couple of weeks). His over-riding message at breakfast was that the money is there, if politicians are willing to harness it. They must not be allowed to hide behind technicalities. And he will back the idea with philanthropic cash if it gets enough momentum, as he has done previously with the Publish What You Pay campaign. What do people think?

What’s on the Copenhagen table part 2: developing countries

As ministers and heads of state start to fly in, and Copenhagen (hopefully) gets serious,  here’s the companion to my previous post, summarizing key developing country positions in the negotiations. Let me know if there are any mistakes/additions and I’ll pass them on. [sorry for two blogs in one day, but this week is a bit special, and I promise to stop over Christmas....]

China

Curbing Emissions Growth
China announced in November that it would voluntarily cut emissions per unit of GDP by 40 to 45% by 2020 compared with levels in 2005 – this is equivalent to up to a 12.5% deviation from business as usual emissions.

Note: China is one of the crucial countries to a deal on emission reduction. The potential is there for more ambition from China (and all other developing countries) if rich countries put significant finance and technology transfer on the table.

Financial Demands On Rich Countries
China as part of the G77+China bloc, has asked for 0.5 to 1% of rich country GDP in long-term financing. [note from me: The BBC was reporting today that ‘A senior Chinese source told BBC News that China will not accept a single dollar’ of this money in order to avoid alienating the US Congress]

India

Curbing Emissions Growth
Shortly before Copenhagen, India committed to cut emissions per unit of GDP by 20-25% on 2005 levels by 2020. India has indicated it is prepared to ″do more″ if Copenhagen produces a satisfactory deal.

Financial Demands On Rich Countries
India as part of the G77+China bloc, has asked for 0.5 to 1% of rich country GDP in long-term financing.

South Africa

Curbing Emissions Growth
In the first week of Copenhagen, South Africa pledged a 34% emissions reduction below business as usual by 2020 and 42% by 2025. This commitment is conditional on a “fair, ambitious, and effective” global deal, including under the Kyoto Protocol, and importantly on international finance, technology, and capacity-building support from rich countries.

Financial Demands On Rich Countries
Last week, president Jacob Zuma said that $100bn per year is needed for low carbon development and a further $100bn per year for adaptation.

Brazil

Curbing Emissions Growth
Brazil has voluntarily pledged to curb emissions by close to 40% below business as usual by 2020 –including an 80% reduction of deforestation. The pledge is included in a bill that has been passed by the House and Senate. Brazil is prepared to measure, report and verify these reductions.

Financial Demands On Rich Countries
Brazil as part of the G77+China bloc, has asked for 0.5 to 1% of rich country GDP in long-term financing.

Africa Group

Financial Demands On Rich Countries
In a draft text from last week at Copenhagen, the group demands rich countries allocate the following percentage of GDP to support developing countries:
- Short-term: between 0.5 and 1% – worth over $400bn a year.
- Long-term: 5%.

Least Developed Countries (LDCs)

Financial Demands On Rich Countries: The group wants rich countries to provide 1.5% of their GDP for long-term finance for developing nations.

Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)

Financial Demands On Rich Countries: The group wants rich countries to provide between 0.5 and 2% of their GDP as long-term finance for developing nations.

Indonesia

Curbing Emissions Growth
In September, Indonesia made official a 26% reduction in emissions compared with business as usual in 2020. With international support, Indonesia is confident it could cut emissions by as much as 41% below business as usual.

Financial Demands On Rich Countries
Indonesia as part of the G77+China bloc has asked for 0.5 to 1% of rich country GDP in long-term financing.

South Korea

Curbing Emissions Growth
In November, South Korea voluntarily committed to 30 percent reduction by 2020 from its forecast under a “business as usual” scenario. This is equivalent to a 4% reduction on 1990 levels.

Financial Demands On Rich Countries
South Korea is a member of the OECD, but paradoxically is not an annex 1 country under the Kyoto Protocol. It therefore does not have binding emissions reductions and could receive financial support in order to undertake emissions reductions. Not vocal on finance.

Mexico

Curbing Emissions Growth
Mexico proposed to curb emissions by 50% by 2050 (30% by 2020) below business as usual. The target is framed as “aspirational” and contingent on a multilateral regime that deploys significant financial and technological resources.

Financial Demands On Rich Countries
Architect of the ‘Green Fund Proposal’ – a fund into which all countries would make contributions based on their emissions and wealth. Mexico has proposed that this could raise $10bn a year. In fact, much more is required. Mexico and Norway have presented today (15 December) a joint document combining key elements of the Mexican and Norwegian proposals.

Copenhagen: What have Developed Countries put on the table so far?

Here’s a handy guide from our Copenhagen team to all the offers currently on the table from developed countries (I’m now off to do a companion post on developing country positions). Do let me know if there are any mistakes/additions and I’ll pass them on.

European Union

Emission Reductions
At last week’s EU summit, leaders did not agree to 30% reduction target. Germany was a major blocker. In December 2008, the European Union committed to:
20% cuts in emissions on 1990 levels by 2020 in EU legislation; 30% if other developed countries commit to comparable reductions and advanced developing countries agree to take substantive efforts to reduce their emissions.

Climate Finance Offer For Developing Countries 
EU leaders agreed last week to provide €2.4bn per year for the next three years as ‘fast-start’ financing for urgent adaptation needs, and to kick-start action to tackle emissions growth in developing countries. This money, for short-term action, is mostly made up of a recycling of past promises, and payments that have already been made.

EU leaders agreed in October that up to €100bn per year by 2020 will be needed in developing countries to help them cope with global warming. From this figure, €22-50bn would come from public sources, with the EU’s fair share of this estimated by the European Commission, to be between €2-15bn per year. The EU meeting its fair share would be conditional on efforts of other countries, including developing countries – but not Least Developing Countries. The EU as a bloc has, however, failed to clarify if this money would or not come from existing promises made by rich countries to provide 0.7% of national income as development aid. Last week, individually, France and Spain joined the UK, Netherlands, Denmark and Belgium in arguing that rich countries must not divert money from schools and hospitals to pay for their climate debt.

Political Dynamics
EU leaders missed an opportunity last week to increase their emission target to 30% and make a unilateral offer on long-term finance. An increase in ambition from the EU is key to creating the space for other rich countries to raise their game. To regain trust with developing countries, EU leaders need to come to Copenhagen this week ready to commit their fair share of the long-term finance poor countries need – upwards of 35 billion euros in new money every year from 2013; and guarantee beyond all doubt that the money will come on top of the promises already made on development aid.

United States

Emission Reductions
The US says a final commitment is not possible until domestic climate legislation passes through the Senate in spring 2010, at the earliest. However, the US administration has proposed a conditional target “in the range of 17%” by 2020 below 2005 levels, which is equivalent to a 4% cut below 1990 levels

Climate Finance Offer For Developing Countries 
The US has not yet put any money on the table for long-term financing post-2012.
The US is expected to offer short-term financing of $1-1.3bn per year for 2010-2012 at Copenhagen, as part of a proposed $10bn per year package by rich countries.

Political Dynamics
While its overall level of ambition on emission cuts is low compared to most other rich countries, it is encouraging that the US administration has decided to come to Copenhagen with a mitigation offer, subject to the national legislative process. However, emissions are only half the deal – the other half is finance. If the Euputs long-term money on the table (post-2012), it will increase the pressure on the US to move on this.

Japan

Emission Reductions
In September, Japan announced 25% reduction in emissions by 2020 on 1990 levels.

Climate Finance Offer For Developing Countries 
Prime Minister Hatoyama has recognised the need for new and additional public resources, but an offer of finance is still not forthcoming. Japan is understood to be keen to avoid making long-term financing commitments at Copenhagen, but may move if the EU does.

Political Dynamics
The new government has brought a welcome new, more ambitious emissions target. However last week’s announcement that this was not for operationalisation within the binding framework of a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol infuriated developing countries. [no I don’t know what that means either – I’ll check]

Australia

Emission Reductions
Australia announced in December 2008:
5% reduction in emissions by 2020 on 2000 levels
25% reduction if there is an agreement where major developing economies commit to substantially reduce emissions and advanced economies take on commitments comparable to Australia’s.

Climate Finance Offer For Developing Countries 
Prime Minister Rudd had previously said that delivering climate financing for developing countries ‘has to be dealt with’. As a Commonwealth country, Australia signed onto the recent Port of Spain declaration, which recognised that climate finance should be new and additional to existing aid commitments, but is yet to make a firm commitment on financing. 

Political Dynamics
The domestic emissions trading legislation was rejected by the Senate for a second time just before Copenhagen. This does not limit the Government’s practical ability to deliver emissions reductions. However, it does make it less likely that Australia will go to the top of its range due to the added domestic political difficulties. 

Canada

Emission Reductions
In 2006 Canada repudiated its Kyoto commitments. In 2008 Canada announced a target of 20% cuts by 2020 on 2006 levels, which is equivalent to a 3% cut on 1990 levels if LULUCF (Land use, land-use change and forestry) is excluded – including emissions from LULUCF, the target would imply an increase in emissions.

Climate Finance Offer For Developing Countries 
As a Commonwealth country, Canada signed onto the recent Port of Spain declaration, which offered $10 billion per year by 2012 as fast start financing for developing countries. Despite agreeing to pay its fair share, Canada has not recognised that climate finance should be new and additional to existing aid commitments and has made no specific financial commitment beyond the current fiscal year. Canada’s past contributions to adaptation have come out of the aid budget

Political Dynamics
Canada’s low ambition on emission reductions, its repudiation of its Kyoto target, and lack of enthusiasm for negotiations to date appear linked to the government’s desire to protect expanding oil production in the Prime Minister’s home province. Ambition from the US will be key to unlocking ambition in Canada, as Canada has argued it must move in lock-step with the US to remain competitive.

Norway

Emission Reductions
In October, Norway committed to a 40% reduction in emissions on 1990 level and to become “carbon neutral” by 2030

Climate Finance Offer For Developing Countries 
Architect of the ‘Norwegian Proposal’ – a mechanism which could raise hundreds of billions of dollars per year through the auctioning of international emission permits to rich countries. This money could be used for climate action in developing countries. Norway and Mexico have presented today (15 December) a joint document with key elements from both the Mexican and the Norwegian proposals.

Political Dynamics
Norway is the only rich country to commit to curbing emissions by 40% or over, which is in line with what the science says is necessary to avoid catastrophic climate change.

New Zealand

Emission Reductions
In August, New Zealand announced a 10-20% reduction in emissions by 2020 compared to 1990 levels.

Climate Finance Offer For Developing Countries 
As a Commonwealth country, signed onto the recent Port of Spain declaration, which offered $10 billion per year by 2012 as fast start financing for developing countries, and recognised that climate finance should be new and additional to existing aid commitments. 

Political Dynamics
New Zealand argues that its reliance on agriculture makes it a special case among rich countries as far as emissions reductions go. However its current targets fall a long way short of its fair share.

World Bank and dirty coal; rain makes you taller; IMF v Brazil on capital controls; Oxfam in Copenhagen; climate rows in graphics and the onward march of US unemployment: links I liked

How can the World Bank bid for becoming the big climate change financing agency when it continues to subsidise dirty coal?

Update: a vehement response to the article from the World Bank

The amount of rain that fell during your first year of life affects subsequent educational achievement, health, height and wealth [h/t Keith Johnston]

When will the IMF get rid of its ideological blinkers on regulating capital? Kevin Gallagher discusses why the Fund should be less grudging on Brazil’s use of capital controls.

I won’t be at the climate summit (Oxfam capping numbers and all that), but if you want to see what we’re up to go here

The Information is Beautiful website pulls together (and turns into graphics) the Climate Deniers vs Climate Consensus debates [h/t Richard King]

And finally, watch the crushing advance of the US recession, from the coasts inwards [h/t Eddy Lambert]