Degrowth – is it useful or feasible?

Thought I’d check out what this ‘degrowth’ idea is about so went to a public meeting organized by a couple of new economics thinktanks (CEECEC and nef). It was a combination of seriously old school (standing room only; two and a half hours of speeches) and new (the bar was open throughout the event; death by powerpoint).

‘Degrowth’ is the clunky translation of ‘decroissance’, a movement founded by French

Serge Latouche

economist Serge Latouche, whose name was invoked in reverential tones all night. It’s big in France, Italy and Spain (its second major international conference takes place in Barcelona in March) but has yet to catch on in the UK. Based on last night’s presentations, I think it’s likely to stay that way. Speakers struggled to define what degrowth actually means, merely citing a plethora of economic ideas and schools of thought. As for lowly anglo-saxon concerns like ‘what does this mean for my pension/job/house/children?’, forget it.

Instead, the speakers largely replicated the practices of environmentalists and economists everywhere, presenting a series of ‘if I ruled the world’ fantasies which, however clever, did not connect with everyday issues of power or public opinion. Anyone who disagreed with degrowth was either a knave, a fool or both.

I had more serious concerns than the tone of the event, though. Stephen Spratt of new economics foundation blew a rather large hole in the idea when he argued ‘we don’t know how a shrinking economy would work’. It’s all very well to argue that there are objective limits to growth (as I have done elsewhere on this blog), but what would a world of shrinking GDP actually look like? Episodes of ‘deleveraging’ tend to be chaotic and bloody – collapsing companies, rising unemployment and political turmoil – not the carefully managed downsizing envisaged by degrowth.

There are hard economic reasons for that chaos. ‘De-growth is unstable’ as another speaker, the excellent Tim Jackson, author of ‘Prosperity without Growth’, explained. In the modern economy, labour productivity holds the key to success, driven by competition. That means producing more with fewer people. When you do that, either you grow, or unemployment rises. If one firm decides to pursue ‘degrowth’, its competitors will rapidly put it out of business. It makes the economy sound like a bicycle – if you don’t keep moving forward, you fall off.

‘We’re locked into an economic structure that forces us into growth’, Tim concluded, seeing this basic flaw as the reason for the ‘visceral fear’ he perceives in policy makers when he raises limits to growth with them. They know that shrinking economies jeopardise social and political stability.

What to do? Tim argues that yes, everything has to change before anything can change, but that is possible. Institutions and values are always evolving, and have to do so, if we are to escape from the growth trap. He tried to put meat on the bones of this proposition in Prosperity Without Growth, suggesting ‘12 steps to a sustainable economy’, based on changing our economics and investment patterns, investing in people and redistribution, tackling consumerism and respecting ecological boundaries.

But nothing he said seemed to deal with the bicycle problem. In an effort to end the marathon on an upbeat note, he put forward an essentially voluntarist position that ‘desire and capacity to work for change’ are the key. They are necessary undoubtedly, but so is power analysis, understanding where opponents are coming from and how they can be influenced. To worry about the realities of power is not to be defeatist, it is to be serious about change. But those skills seemed pretty well absent in the room, though at least Tim urged people not to portray opponents of degrowth as ‘cardboard cutouts’, but people with genuine reasons for scepticism.

And there was very little interest in developing countries. The occasional bit of misconceived romanticism, arguing that poor communities are all based on reciprocity and love and have no need of base material things (oh dear), and some nods towards redistribution, but nothing about the possibility of rationing growth to enable it to help poor countries, as I have discussed previously. And lots of comfort for the localizers and food miles people who are quite happy to deprive Africa of export markets. Growth was bad, end of story. Sure growth is a dirty and inefficient way to reduce poverty, but at a national or international scale, we know of no alternatives that have actually worked (rather than been dreamt up in academic common rooms).

Oxfam’s ABC to campaigning says that success requires a problem, a solution and a villain. Degrowth has 2 out of 3 – the problem and the villain – but the solution looks very unconvincing right now. As the word itself demonstrates, it is clear what it is against, but not what it is for and still less, how to get there.

So (at least on on the basis of one evening meeting – I haven’t read Latouche yet), it felt like there’s a long way to go before ‘degrowth’ or anything like it looks like a credible proposition. For starters, can any economists out there help with the bicycle problem – is it real or imagined and if real, how can it be got round?

Further Reading: ‘Farewell to Growth’, Serge Latouche; Prosperity without Growth, Tim Jackson; The Great Transition, nef

Are dogs the real population problem on climate change?

After Copenhagen, allow me some bleak Christmas humour. If you’re a dog lover, look away now. But before you reach for the green ink, remember this is an attempt at satire.

I got some fairly aggressive responses to my recent posts on population, and one of the core arguments of the population controllers seemed to be that because climate change and women’s rights over their fertility (see previous blog for why I reject the term ‘population control’) are both important, there is no harm in linking them. On that argument, since education, land tenure, arms control, housing, domestic violence etc etc etc are all important aspects of development, they too should be on the table in Copenhagen. Clearly nonsense.

But while we’re on the subject of carbon emitting populations, let’s talk about dogs. Britain is, famously, a nation of dog lovers. Actually it’s bitterly divided between cat people and dog people. We Brits own eight million cats, eight million dogs and very few of us own one of each (not least because they don’t get on).

For the record, I am a cat person. I once ate a dog (or part of one) in a backstreet Korean

time to chose?

restaurant and it was delicious. Not a qualm. Anyway, back to dogs and climate change. The BBC’s ‘Ethical Man’ (probably another cat lover) has done the numbers. Keeping a medium-sized dog has the same ecological impact as driving a 4.6 litre Land Cruiser (I assume that’s some kind of car) 10,000km a year.

Using a unit known as a ‘global hectare’ – a measure of the land area needed to support a certain ecological footprint, growing and manufacturing the 164kg of meat and 95kg of cereals a border collie or cocker spaniel eats every year takes about 0.84 gha. A bigger dog such as a German shepherd consumes even more – its carbon pawprint is more like 1.1 gha. That is more than the environmental footprint of the average Indian person, who uses just 0.8 gha of resources. If you are a multiple dog owner you are in even more trouble. Two big dogs are responsible for more carbon emissions than some British citizens.

By contrast a cat (hah!) needs 0.15 gha, a hamster 0.014 gha, and a canary 0.007 gha. The most carbon efficient pet is a goldfish. Its carbon finprint requires just 0.00034 gha. That’s over 3,000 fish per pooch.

It's the dog's fault

So if you care about climate change, join my new campaign. Our key demand is a ‘fish for fidos’ scheme, loosely based on Cash for Clunkers, whereby people trade in their dogs in return for goldfish. It makes at least as much sense to promote this as a solution to climate change as human population control in poor countries. Any takers, pop controllers?

And with that, you’ll be relieved to hear, I’m signing off and taking a break. Whether you celebrate Christmas, just lie around and eat and drink too much, or carry on as usual, enjoy the next two weeks and see (or at least talk at) you in 2010.

Tobin tax update: how momentum is building for a Financial Transactions Tax

The momentum behind the Financial Transactions Tax (a tiny levy of 0.005% on all financial trades would raise about $30bn a year for climate change, development and/or filling fiscal holes) continues to grow since my last post (Why has the Tobin Tax gone mainstream?).

The French government, which as far back as 2003 was the first to seriously propose the tax, portrays it as one of the innovative financial instruments needed to finance development and climate change response. See for example the recent op-ed by the Finance and Foreign Ministers, Lagarde and Kouchner, in Le Monde saying they support an FTT to finance development.

In advance of its recent pre budget report, the UK government issued a report supporting exploring the FTT as one of a number of options. On 10 December, President Sarkozy and Gordon Brown wrote a joint op-ed in the Wall Street Journal calling for ‘examination’ of an FTT, among other measures, to contribute to climate change response and achieving the MDGs. The European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso has also weighed in in support.

In the US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi expressed qualified support on the FTT on the 7th December, while various heavyweight economists have come out in favour, including Paul Krugman in the New York Times. A democratic congressman, Peter Di Fazio has introduced a bill in Congress calling for a tax on financial transactions, to help pay for job creation in the US. This is supported by 25 other congressmen, and calls for a 0.25 percent tax on every applicable transaction, which its proponent believe would generate nearly $150 billion a year. In response Treasury Secretary Tim Geitner moderated his initial opposition to an FTT, saying merely that ‘he has not seen a version of this tax that would work for the US’.

The worry in all this is the role of the IMF, tasked by the G20 in Pittsburgh to look at ‘ways in which the financial sector could be made to contribute to the cost of the bailouts’ and report back to the G20 meeting in April 2010 (a draft report will also be presented to the G7 finance ministers in February). At the IMF meetings in Istanbul, Dominique Strauss Kahn, the Managing Director of the World Bank, appeared to say that the IMF would not be looking at transaction taxes, or ‘simplistic tobin taxes’, but pressure from the Europeans has made him adopt a more open-minded position. At least in public. But there has to be doubt over whether the Fund has made up its mind before conducting the analysis – watch out for some ‘policy-based evidence making’ over the next few months. A lot will depend on the calibre of the external inputs to the IMF from technical experts outside of the fund.

Movement at the political level is being pushed by a nascent global campaign by NGOs, campaigners and economists:
· Health groups around the world are already very organised and working together on campaigning for a currency transaction levy (CTL) for health
· In Germany a major campaign has been launched to press for the FTT that has already gained the 50,000 signatures required to ensure hearings on the tax in the Bundestag.
· French campaigners have already met with government and are working on next steps.
· In the UK a broad coalition is forming to support a campaign, running intensely from January to April 2010, to the G20 finance ministers meeting in Washington. Their joint campaign will launch in January just before Davos.
· Richard Curtis (Film director and creative energy behind the Make Poverty History Campaign) is very interested in a short FTT campaign. He was behind the idea of the white band in 2005.

The next few months could be crucial if the FTT is to become the Fast Track Tax. If the momentum builds, then the G20 discussion in April could be a turning point. My one query is that I still haven’t heard anything from developing country governments, economists or civil society organizations – any news?

Breakfast (and climate change megabucks) with George Soros

Last week George Soros was passing through London and invited a bunch of NGO types for breakfast at his very nice house in South Kensington. (In case you’re interested we all got sticky pastries, but George made do with grapefruit and muesli). He was en route to Copenhagen to launch his big new idea – using the IMF to pump prime global funding for climate change. How does it work? Here’s the excellent summary put out by his team:

‘Rich countries could double available funding to combat climate change by donating recently issued Special Drawing Rights to a new green fund. This fund would jumpstart investment in low carbon energy sources, reforestation efforts, rain forest protection, land use reform, and adaptation programs.

Unlike other proposed solutions, this plan could be implemented within already existing financial structures. SDRs, issued by the International Monetary Fund, amount to additional foreign exchange. In response to the global financial crisis in September 2009, the IMF issued $283 billion in SDRs, with more than $150 billion going to the 15 largest developed economies. This sits largely untouched in their reserve accounts, leaving a surplus that could be donated to the fund.

The IMF currently has 100 million ounces of gold, at current prices worth more than $100 billion at book value. The IMF has decided that the surplus value of its gold be used to benefit the least developed countries. Under this plan, the IMF would use its gold reserves to cover the interest incurred by the developed countries that donated their SDRs.

Paying the interest in this way would mean that developed countries would not be saddled with interest payments. In addition, the gold can also be used to guarantee the repayment of loans for the climate projects if the carbon market fails to develop as envisioned.

“This approach gives developed countries an additional incentive to create effective carbon markets,” said Soros. “If they fail, they will have to use the IMF gold reserves to cover the loan principal. This forces countries to put their money where their mouth is.”

A rapid independent analysis by the European Climate Foundation  (not up on the web yet, sorry) concluded:

‘Our analysis shows that $100 billion of SDRs allocated to a climate fund or funds could provide about $7 billion1 per year in grants, loan and equity financing to developing countries on an annual basis for the next 30-40 years. The SDR source would meet the tests of predictable funding flows, strong performance incentives, and limited short-term budgetary impact on developed country finances. This use of SDRs, particularly for adaptation, could potentially be justified under the mandate of the IMF given the adverse impacts of climate change will negatively impact the balance of payments and currency reserves of vulnerable countries.’

Time to open the vault?

The interesting precedent here is using the huge amount of gold lying around in the IMF to turn SDRs into free, potentially indefinite loans for poor countries. He’s gone for the existing SDR issue because that could be rapidly turned into cash for climate change adaptation, but the IMF’s idle gold mountain could cover the interest payments on a new and much larger SDR issue, potentially generating trillions of dollars for climate change and development. Soros describes it as, if not a free, then a ‘cheap lunch’. It looks to me like a kind of global, climate-focussed form of quantitative easing.

If it’s so easy, why hasn’t it happened already? Soros sees the main obstacles as political, not technical. Mainly, they consist of opposition in the US Congress and to a lesser extent, Germany, based on fears of inflation and the impact on the dollar/euro’s positions as international reserve currencies (China’s Central Bank governor recently argued that SDRs could provide the basis of a viable global currency). Congress would need to approve a change in the IMF’s articles of agreement before they could issue new SDRs and that is highly unlikely, unless massive public pressure builds to make it happen (as it did previously with debt relief). That’s why he’s stuck to the already issued SDRs in this proposal.

Soros sees the SDR proposal as a complement to other ways to raise additional funds for climate change and development, such as the Financial Transactions Tax.  Put them in the pot along with bunker fuel taxes, airline taxes etc, and you have the makings of a grand bargain that could fund the kinds of vast technological and economic shifts required to avoid climate catastrophe and achieve lasting development. Soros contrasts this with what he calls ‘the usual $10 billion’ likely to be agreed at Copenhagen, as at other summits, much of it merely recycling existing spending commitments.

So has Mr Soros found $100bn down the back of the sofa? This kind of funny money discussion makes my head spin, but when it comes to financial alchemy, Soros knows what he’s talking about  He famously turned a $1bn profit by ‘breaking the pound’ in 1992. He’s given away $6bn in his philanthropic work, but is still the 29th richest person in the world, worth about $11bn (enough on its own to end world poverty for at least a couple of weeks). His over-riding message at breakfast was that the money is there, if politicians are willing to harness it. They must not be allowed to hide behind technicalities. And he will back the idea with philanthropic cash if it gets enough momentum, as he has done previously with the Publish What You Pay campaign. What do people think?

What’s on the Copenhagen table part 2: developing countries

As ministers and heads of state start to fly in, and Copenhagen (hopefully) gets serious,  here’s the companion to my previous post, summarizing key developing country positions in the negotiations. Let me know if there are any mistakes/additions and I’ll pass them on. [sorry for two blogs in one day, but this week is a bit special, and I promise to stop over Christmas....]

China

Curbing Emissions Growth
China announced in November that it would voluntarily cut emissions per unit of GDP by 40 to 45% by 2020 compared with levels in 2005 – this is equivalent to up to a 12.5% deviation from business as usual emissions.

Note: China is one of the crucial countries to a deal on emission reduction. The potential is there for more ambition from China (and all other developing countries) if rich countries put significant finance and technology transfer on the table.

Financial Demands On Rich Countries
China as part of the G77+China bloc, has asked for 0.5 to 1% of rich country GDP in long-term financing. [note from me: The BBC was reporting today that ‘A senior Chinese source told BBC News that China will not accept a single dollar’ of this money in order to avoid alienating the US Congress]

India

Curbing Emissions Growth
Shortly before Copenhagen, India committed to cut emissions per unit of GDP by 20-25% on 2005 levels by 2020. India has indicated it is prepared to ″do more″ if Copenhagen produces a satisfactory deal.

Financial Demands On Rich Countries
India as part of the G77+China bloc, has asked for 0.5 to 1% of rich country GDP in long-term financing.

South Africa

Curbing Emissions Growth
In the first week of Copenhagen, South Africa pledged a 34% emissions reduction below business as usual by 2020 and 42% by 2025. This commitment is conditional on a “fair, ambitious, and effective” global deal, including under the Kyoto Protocol, and importantly on international finance, technology, and capacity-building support from rich countries.

Financial Demands On Rich Countries
Last week, president Jacob Zuma said that $100bn per year is needed for low carbon development and a further $100bn per year for adaptation.

Brazil

Curbing Emissions Growth
Brazil has voluntarily pledged to curb emissions by close to 40% below business as usual by 2020 –including an 80% reduction of deforestation. The pledge is included in a bill that has been passed by the House and Senate. Brazil is prepared to measure, report and verify these reductions.

Financial Demands On Rich Countries
Brazil as part of the G77+China bloc, has asked for 0.5 to 1% of rich country GDP in long-term financing.

Africa Group

Financial Demands On Rich Countries
In a draft text from last week at Copenhagen, the group demands rich countries allocate the following percentage of GDP to support developing countries:
- Short-term: between 0.5 and 1% – worth over $400bn a year.
- Long-term: 5%.

Least Developed Countries (LDCs)

Financial Demands On Rich Countries: The group wants rich countries to provide 1.5% of their GDP for long-term finance for developing nations.

Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)

Financial Demands On Rich Countries: The group wants rich countries to provide between 0.5 and 2% of their GDP as long-term finance for developing nations.

Indonesia

Curbing Emissions Growth
In September, Indonesia made official a 26% reduction in emissions compared with business as usual in 2020. With international support, Indonesia is confident it could cut emissions by as much as 41% below business as usual.

Financial Demands On Rich Countries
Indonesia as part of the G77+China bloc has asked for 0.5 to 1% of rich country GDP in long-term financing.

South Korea

Curbing Emissions Growth
In November, South Korea voluntarily committed to 30 percent reduction by 2020 from its forecast under a “business as usual” scenario. This is equivalent to a 4% reduction on 1990 levels.

Financial Demands On Rich Countries
South Korea is a member of the OECD, but paradoxically is not an annex 1 country under the Kyoto Protocol. It therefore does not have binding emissions reductions and could receive financial support in order to undertake emissions reductions. Not vocal on finance.

Mexico

Curbing Emissions Growth
Mexico proposed to curb emissions by 50% by 2050 (30% by 2020) below business as usual. The target is framed as “aspirational” and contingent on a multilateral regime that deploys significant financial and technological resources.

Financial Demands On Rich Countries
Architect of the ‘Green Fund Proposal’ – a fund into which all countries would make contributions based on their emissions and wealth. Mexico has proposed that this could raise $10bn a year. In fact, much more is required. Mexico and Norway have presented today (15 December) a joint document combining key elements of the Mexican and Norwegian proposals.

Copenhagen: What have Developed Countries put on the table so far?

Here’s a handy guide from our Copenhagen team to all the offers currently on the table from developed countries (I’m now off to do a companion post on developing country positions). Do let me know if there are any mistakes/additions and I’ll pass them on.

European Union

Emission Reductions
At last week’s EU summit, leaders did not agree to 30% reduction target. Germany was a major blocker. In December 2008, the European Union committed to:
20% cuts in emissions on 1990 levels by 2020 in EU legislation; 30% if other developed countries commit to comparable reductions and advanced developing countries agree to take substantive efforts to reduce their emissions.

Climate Finance Offer For Developing Countries 
EU leaders agreed last week to provide €2.4bn per year for the next three years as ‘fast-start’ financing for urgent adaptation needs, and to kick-start action to tackle emissions growth in developing countries. This money, for short-term action, is mostly made up of a recycling of past promises, and payments that have already been made.

EU leaders agreed in October that up to €100bn per year by 2020 will be needed in developing countries to help them cope with global warming. From this figure, €22-50bn would come from public sources, with the EU’s fair share of this estimated by the European Commission, to be between €2-15bn per year. The EU meeting its fair share would be conditional on efforts of other countries, including developing countries – but not Least Developing Countries. The EU as a bloc has, however, failed to clarify if this money would or not come from existing promises made by rich countries to provide 0.7% of national income as development aid. Last week, individually, France and Spain joined the UK, Netherlands, Denmark and Belgium in arguing that rich countries must not divert money from schools and hospitals to pay for their climate debt.

Political Dynamics
EU leaders missed an opportunity last week to increase their emission target to 30% and make a unilateral offer on long-term finance. An increase in ambition from the EU is key to creating the space for other rich countries to raise their game. To regain trust with developing countries, EU leaders need to come to Copenhagen this week ready to commit their fair share of the long-term finance poor countries need – upwards of 35 billion euros in new money every year from 2013; and guarantee beyond all doubt that the money will come on top of the promises already made on development aid.

United States

Emission Reductions
The US says a final commitment is not possible until domestic climate legislation passes through the Senate in spring 2010, at the earliest. However, the US administration has proposed a conditional target “in the range of 17%” by 2020 below 2005 levels, which is equivalent to a 4% cut below 1990 levels

Climate Finance Offer For Developing Countries 
The US has not yet put any money on the table for long-term financing post-2012.
The US is expected to offer short-term financing of $1-1.3bn per year for 2010-2012 at Copenhagen, as part of a proposed $10bn per year package by rich countries.

Political Dynamics
While its overall level of ambition on emission cuts is low compared to most other rich countries, it is encouraging that the US administration has decided to come to Copenhagen with a mitigation offer, subject to the national legislative process. However, emissions are only half the deal – the other half is finance. If the Euputs long-term money on the table (post-2012), it will increase the pressure on the US to move on this.

Japan

Emission Reductions
In September, Japan announced 25% reduction in emissions by 2020 on 1990 levels.

Climate Finance Offer For Developing Countries 
Prime Minister Hatoyama has recognised the need for new and additional public resources, but an offer of finance is still not forthcoming. Japan is understood to be keen to avoid making long-term financing commitments at Copenhagen, but may move if the EU does.

Political Dynamics
The new government has brought a welcome new, more ambitious emissions target. However last week’s announcement that this was not for operationalisation within the binding framework of a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol infuriated developing countries. [no I don’t know what that means either – I’ll check]

Australia

Emission Reductions
Australia announced in December 2008:
5% reduction in emissions by 2020 on 2000 levels
25% reduction if there is an agreement where major developing economies commit to substantially reduce emissions and advanced economies take on commitments comparable to Australia’s.

Climate Finance Offer For Developing Countries 
Prime Minister Rudd had previously said that delivering climate financing for developing countries ‘has to be dealt with’. As a Commonwealth country, Australia signed onto the recent Port of Spain declaration, which recognised that climate finance should be new and additional to existing aid commitments, but is yet to make a firm commitment on financing. 

Political Dynamics
The domestic emissions trading legislation was rejected by the Senate for a second time just before Copenhagen. This does not limit the Government’s practical ability to deliver emissions reductions. However, it does make it less likely that Australia will go to the top of its range due to the added domestic political difficulties. 

Canada

Emission Reductions
In 2006 Canada repudiated its Kyoto commitments. In 2008 Canada announced a target of 20% cuts by 2020 on 2006 levels, which is equivalent to a 3% cut on 1990 levels if LULUCF (Land use, land-use change and forestry) is excluded – including emissions from LULUCF, the target would imply an increase in emissions.

Climate Finance Offer For Developing Countries 
As a Commonwealth country, Canada signed onto the recent Port of Spain declaration, which offered $10 billion per year by 2012 as fast start financing for developing countries. Despite agreeing to pay its fair share, Canada has not recognised that climate finance should be new and additional to existing aid commitments and has made no specific financial commitment beyond the current fiscal year. Canada’s past contributions to adaptation have come out of the aid budget

Political Dynamics
Canada’s low ambition on emission reductions, its repudiation of its Kyoto target, and lack of enthusiasm for negotiations to date appear linked to the government’s desire to protect expanding oil production in the Prime Minister’s home province. Ambition from the US will be key to unlocking ambition in Canada, as Canada has argued it must move in lock-step with the US to remain competitive.

Norway

Emission Reductions
In October, Norway committed to a 40% reduction in emissions on 1990 level and to become “carbon neutral” by 2030

Climate Finance Offer For Developing Countries 
Architect of the ‘Norwegian Proposal’ – a mechanism which could raise hundreds of billions of dollars per year through the auctioning of international emission permits to rich countries. This money could be used for climate action in developing countries. Norway and Mexico have presented today (15 December) a joint document with key elements from both the Mexican and the Norwegian proposals.

Political Dynamics
Norway is the only rich country to commit to curbing emissions by 40% or over, which is in line with what the science says is necessary to avoid catastrophic climate change.

New Zealand

Emission Reductions
In August, New Zealand announced a 10-20% reduction in emissions by 2020 compared to 1990 levels.

Climate Finance Offer For Developing Countries 
As a Commonwealth country, signed onto the recent Port of Spain declaration, which offered $10 billion per year by 2012 as fast start financing for developing countries, and recognised that climate finance should be new and additional to existing aid commitments. 

Political Dynamics
New Zealand argues that its reliance on agriculture makes it a special case among rich countries as far as emissions reductions go. However its current targets fall a long way short of its fair share.

Population: why it’s a dangerous distraction on climate change (and makes us feel uncomfortable)

Trust the military to give it to me straight. Population comes up at virtually every talk I give – on climate change, development or just about anything else. But usually my questioners are a bit more circumspect than the man from the armed forces who recently asked what could be done about ‘women popping them out’ in poor countries.

People cause climate change, therefore cut the number of people. Right? Not really. A closer look shows that the conventional view is wrong, or at least a gross over-simplification.

Malthus goes to the beach

First, the numbers. The global population is about 6.8 billion and rising, but the rate of growth is slowing and the world population is expected to peak at about 9 billion in 2050. The growth rate is slowing fast, verging on collapse in some countries (South Korea is in a national panic about falling fertility rates and shrinking populations and is likely to look to immigration to fill the gap). The drivers for a far faster demographic transition than that seen in previous centuries in Europe or America are a combination of urbanization, women’s education, access to contraception and (one hopes) the spread of notion’s of women’s rights and control over their own fertility.

So one response is that the ‘problem’ is self-correcting, and indeed, if the transition gets any faster, the world could be faced by a serious shortage of working age people to look after the rising numbers of elderly. If their arguments were based on logic alone, the population control lobby would probably be advocating compulsory euthanasia rather than birth control, but its preponderance of elderly white male members makes that pretty unlikely.

In what sense is population growth a ‘problem’ (or ‘challenge’, as the management-speak people like to say….)?  Certainly not on climate change mitigation – as The Guardian’s George Monbiot argued in a great recent polemic, over the last 30 years, the countries with fastest population growth rates have the slowest emissions growth rate, and vice versa. But that hasn’t stopped a bit of blatant opportunism by the Optimum Population Trust, launching an offset scheme where you can offset your carbon emissions by funding birth control programmes in developing countries. Guys, the problem is consumption, not population. A cull of rich Americans or Australians might have an impact; population growth in Africa is largely irrelevant.

Adapting to climate change is more of an issue. In dozens of developing countries, Oxfam has witnessed the hammering that poor communities are already taking from climate change. Overcrowding in rural areas can increase their vulnerability. But the OPT doesn’t seem too bothered about that (wonder why?). Population is undoubtedly one among many contributory factors t0 hunger and local environmental degradation, although often there is enough food, it’s the distribution that goes wrong.

So if population growth is (sometimes) important, what is to be done? Listen to women, stupid.

the best contraceptive

No coercion is required, just access to education and family planning services (not just contraception, but also proper abortion facilities to reduce the horrendous death toll from backstreet butchers). (And to be fair, the OPT would agree with this). Amartya Sen famously showed that a combination of girl’s education and access to contraception prompted a demographic transition in Kerala every bit as fast as China’s coerceive one child policy.

I’m talking evidence and arguments thus far, but the choice of language also matters. As soon as the issue is framed as ‘population control’, the problem becomes ‘them’ – those women ‘popping them out’. That, along with population control programmes’ chequered history of coercing and tricking people into being sterilized in several notorious cases, is why many people in developing countries find the term so offensive.  Start with ‘women’s rights’ and the discussion becomes about ‘us’, our shared rights and the solidarity to achieve them. Talk about the problem of over-consumption, and the debate revolves around equity, redistribution and low carbon development, not fewer babies.

That discomfort on language is, I think, why so many NGOs tend to avoid the subject altogether. But in doing so, we unwittingly abdicate the ground to the bad guys. Time to go on the offensive?

The population debate matters, especially in these Copenhagen weeks, because it risks becoming a massive distraction. We need to focus on curbing consumption and emissions, not babies and women’s rights. Otherwise we risk blaming the victims and letting the climate villains off the hook.

Want some more ammunition? Enjoy these spectacularly wrong assertions from Paul Ehrlich’s bestseller ‘The Population Bomb’, published in 1968 and I would guess a major, if subliminal, influence on the current crop of population controllers:

‘The battle to feed all of humanity is over. In the 1970s and 1980s hundreds of millions of people will starve to death in spite of any crash programs embarked upon now. At this late date nothing can prevent a substantial increase in the world death rate.

‘”India couldn’t possibly feed two hundred million more people by 1980,”

‘”One general prediction can be made with confidence: the cost of feeding yourself and your family will continue to increase. There may be minor fluctuations in food prices, but the overall trend will be up”.

‘The United States would see its life expectancy drop to 42 years by 1980 because of pesticide usage, and the nation’s population would drop to 22.6 million by 1999′

Oh, and here’s a video of me giving a grumpy interview on the Optimum Population Trust nonsense – it was late and I wanted my dinner…..

A condensed version of this blog was published yesterday by the New Statesman

What to Read on Copenhagen

OK, the Copenhagen climate summit is warming up nicely (even faster than the rest of the world), and I am trying to sift through the information overload. What on earth to read for those of us with limited time and not at the summit? I’ve been asking a few climate change guru chums and here’s a selection.

Overviews

The official COP 15 news page gives you the (conference of the) party line

Columbia Journalism Review summarizes the media coverage

Mainstream Journalism

Richard Black at the BBC is excellent, knowledgeable and prolific

John Vidal at the Guardian got the media coverage going yesterday with a scoop on the so-called ‘Danish Text’ (no blog, but all the Guardian’s Copenhagen coverage is here)

The Financial Times energysource blog is comprehensive and signposts other media coverage

Independent blogs

Grist, a Seattle-based US environment blog

Mother Jones, for some venerable leftie US journalism

Alex Evans over at Global Dashboard, seems to think that everyone is wrong (except him, that is) – but he’s quite persuasive about it…. See for example his critique of John Vidal’s ‘overselling’ of the leaked Danish text

Environment and Development NGOs

ECO, a daily newsletter written by Climate Action Network.

ENB, a daily report of the proceedings prepared by the International Institute for
Sustainable Development

Oxfam’s climate change blog

And finally some light relief

The “Fossil of the Day Award” rewards governments or observers who performed
“best” at blocking progress at the climate negotiations (Canada, Croatia, Ukraine and Russia are the early winners – what is it about those pesky East Europeans?)

and a handy running total of what the current offers will do to global temperature rises, using the standard climate change models

Any other candidates?

Seattle + 10 = Copenhagen?

I went out for a celebratory (if that’s the word) drink this week with a heroic band of Seattle Survivors. Ten years ago we were besuited NGO delegates at the notorious WTO ministerial, which collapsed in a welter of tear gas and turtles (or at least people dressed in turtle suits protesting at WTO rulings on the environment). It’s been fascinating watching the ‘battle in Seattle’ become mythologised as some kind of mass uprising against globalization – at the height of the chaos, I did a rough count of the number of activists blocking off access to the conference centre and it came to a couple of thousand at most, and the violence involved no more than a few dozen black-clad, but journo-photogenic anarchists. In the end, the ministerial

police using pepper spray against protestors

collapsed because the Seattle police in their Robocop outfits over-reacted to a ridiculous extent, making up for their lack of plans or equipment for crowd control (they had no crash barriers) by lobbing random volleys of teargas and pepper spray at non-violent protestors (and the odd government minister). Bill Clinton didn’t help when he alienated the developing countries by arguing for a labour clause on the eve of the conference.

It’s hard to imagine anything similar happening in Copenhagen next week, but it is worth comparing the current climate talks with the travails of the Doha round of trade talks that began at the next WTO meeting after Seattle (and staggered on in Geneva this week at yet another ministerial, largely ignored by the press). Like trade talks, climate negotiations have huge implications for domestic lobbies such as industry and finance, so will be much more heavily fought over than agreements on aid or debt that don’t have the same immediate impact. Like trade, the climate change talks involve shifting constellations of developing countries, trying to reconcile the need for unity with the huge objective differences (in terms of emissions and immediate vulnerability) between countries such as China and Bangladesh. Their opponents will try and exploit these differences, playing divide and rule to weaken any agreement.

But there are two big, and scary, differences. In the WTO, blocking bad agreements is not too bad a result – stopping unnecessarily expensive burdens being placed on poor countries, or forced liberalization or encroachment on their ‘policy space’. And for weaker players, it is often easier to stop bad things happening than to get agreement on good things. In the climate talks, only winning a good agreement will be enough – a far harder challenge. And while delay in trade talks is not too much of a problem, in climate change, delay is expensive, if not catastrophic. The IEA argues that every year of delay in moving towards the required trajectory of emission reductions adds an extra $500bn of costs.

A Kal cartoon in the Economist summarizes what happens if Copenhagen goes the way of Doha – if someone’s going to make a ‘Battle in Seattle’ style film, can they call it ‘Doha’d with a vengeance’, with Bruce Willis as Yvo de Boer?

Is Growth with Equity getting old?

Growth with Equity has been one of the development industry’s overarching economic narratives for over a decade (Oxfam published ‘Economic Growth with Equity: Lessons from East Asia’ in 1998). OK, it’s better than just ‘Growth’, and where it’s been achieved, it has an unrivalled impact on poverty, but thinking has moved on in a number of areas, and G+E is starting to look distinctly threadbare. I’ve been putting up posts on this blog on different aspects of this, but here’s a synthesis, and some links to relevant posts:

1. How much Growth?: Climate Change and other environmental challenges mean that the boundary conditions on economic activity are becoming much more salient.

• Barring a miraculous new technology, it is far from certain that the carbon intensity of growth can be reduced to stay inside a safe emissions pathway at current growth rates. If that is true, then there are only two options: less global growth or more climate change. If the choice is the former, then who grows and who does not (growth rationing) becomes a crucial issue of economic justice. Growth may be just too scarce and precious to waste on the rich countries (where it doesn’t make people any happier).

Further Reading:

• Do we need to ration growth?
• Prosperity without Growth? Report of the UK Sustainable Development Commission

2. Are we measuring the right thing?: The recent report of the Stiglitz Commission to President Sarkozy highlights just how mainstream concerns over measurement have become. Stiglitz argued that the way we measure economic activity has to be reformed on 3 fronts:

Reform GDP to respond to the evolution of the economy – from quantity to quality, from goods to services, the importance of the caring economy etc. (But I’m not sure South Africa is on the right course in expanding GDP to include criminal activity (see article here))

Shift from measuring economic output as the primary indicator of policy success to measuring the impact on human well-being, including the caring economy

Pay much more attention to long term economic, social and environmental sustainability (stocks, rather than flows)

Changing what we measure (and therefore value) might also provide a more imaginative political escape route from the entrenched pro v anti growth debate.

Further reading:

• Stiglitz Commission
• Stiglitz at the OECD well-being conference 
• Stiglitz v Layard

3. The importance of volatility and unpredictability: economic issues are usually discussed in terms of stocks (eg of assets) and flows (e.g. average incomes). However, virtually all serious studies of poor people’s lives show that it is uncertainty and unpredictability that is often the defining, and most dreaded, feature of  ‘ill-being’. This has led to increased interest in a range of mechanisms to reduce vulnerability to such sudden shifts, including social protection, enhanced social capital, disaster risk reduction, keeping health and education free at the point of use etc.

Further Reading:

• Cash transfers and inequality
• Chronic Poverty Report

4. What do we do about Financialisation?: The eclipse of anglo-saxon capitalism, the critique of structural adjustment, and the damage wrought by financial crises in Asia and Latin America, and most recently, the global economic crisis, have led to a profound questioning of the ‘wisdom of markets’. At the same time, the extraordinary size and power of the financial sector, even when reasonably well regulated, poses serious threats to the real economy in which most poor people live. How strong is the case for capping and reducing the overall weight of the financial sector? See interesting piece on shrinking the banks in the most recent issue of Prospect.

And that’s just within the economic arena. There’s plenty more to say on politics and culture (state building, rights, the centrality of faith in the lives of the poor etc etc), but that’s far too much for one blogpost.

Any other candidates on economic issues?